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of subrogation should such a solution prevail.5 3 Surely the injured employee in Campbell took no overt action to compromise the carrier's
rights. He was in fact acting within the statutory provisions of an act
intended manifestly for his benefit, and which waived limitations on
the filing of a claim to ensure the benefit would be received.
Myron E. East, Jr.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT-INVESTIGATORY FILES EXEMPTION-THE GOVERNMENT MAY WITHHOLD INVESTIGATORY MATERIALS

COMPILED FOR A LAW ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING WHICH HAS BEEN
TERMINATED. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972).

The Securities and Exchange Commission inquired into various real
estate transactions made by the Occidental Petroleum Corporation to
determine whether these transactions had violated governmental regu-

lations. During this investigation the Commission amassed over 7000
pages of testimony and other investigatory material relating to affairs
of Occidental. With this information the Commission commenced a
civil action against Occidental and its president, Armand Hammer, on
March 4, 1971. Action was terminated by a consent decree handed
down on March 5, on the basis of which the court entered judgment.
On March 22, 1971, the plaintiffs, shareholders in Occidental Petroleum
Corporation, initiated an action against Occidental and Hammer, alleging damages as a result of the violations of securities laws. The plaintiffs wished to use as their source of facts the material which the Commission had accumulated concerning the violations. The Commission
withheld the documents and the plaintiffs instituted this suit to enjoin
the Commission from withholding the material. The plaintiffs alleged
that the Commission was withholding the documents in violation of the
Freedom of Information Act.' The Commission's defense was that this
information was exempt from disclosure "by virtue of the 'investigatory
files' exemption. ' 2 The trial court held that the "investigatory files"
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act only applies so long as
53 The injured employee's release, compromise, or settlement of his claim with the third
party, thus depriving the carrier of his right to subrogate, would exemplify such a situation.
15 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
2 Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972). The
"investigatory files" exemption is cited as 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). Three other
exemptions were used in the defendant's behalf, but are not relevant to this case. They
are: the "trade secrets" exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970), the "inter-agency and
intra-agency memorandums" exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970), and the exemption
for documents "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)
(1970). Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 2, Art. 8

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

the agency is reasonably likely to be involved in litigation or law
enforcement proceedings.3 Held-Reversed. The "investigatory files"
exemption may be used by a government agency to withhold information which they used in a law enforcement proceeding, even after the
proceeding has been terminated.
The question of releasing government files to the public is one which
has become increasingly more important and controversial in recent
years. 4 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 established the basis
for this area of the law. 5 That Act allowed for much discretion by the
Government in withholding information from the public because it
included vague and broad areas within which the Government could
classify information as being exempt from disclosure.6 Information was
often withheld improperly under this Act, and at times federal agencies
even used the "executive privilege" 7 to keep information bearing on
the governmental process from being disclosed.
The Freedom of Information Act was the result of "over ten years
of congressional study of the practices and procedures of the executive
branch in the administration of national law." The purpose of this
Act, according to congressional reports,9 was to abolish the "loopholes"
of the Administrative Procedure Act and actually give the public
greater access to the workings and operations of administrative agencies
and the federal government in general. For example, one of the House
Reports on the bill stated:
In the time it takes for one generation to grow up and prepare
to join the councils of Government-from 1946 to 1966-the law
which was designed to provide public information about Government activities has become the Government's major shield of secrecy. S. 1160 will correct this situation. It provides the necessary
8 Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd,-F.2d-(2d Cir. 1972). The
district judge narrowed the question by limiting the decision only to the "investigatory
files" exemption. He eliminated the other exemptions cited above from decision by
sending the files to a special master who was to judge how much of the files came under
those exemptions. By doing this, the judge preserved all but the "investigatory files"
exemption to the SEC.
4 Most illustrative of this point are the scandalous "Pentagon papers," files of the
United States Army which were released in 1971 by one Daniel P. Ellsberg.
5 Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (now 5 U.S.C. § 552 [1970]).
6 See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966). Several commentaries also
discuss the deficiencies of the Administrative Procedure Act, e.g., Comment, The 1966
Freedom of Information Act-Early Judicial Interpretations,44 WAsH. L. REV. 641 (1969).
7 This is a constitutional power which almost every President has asserted in order to
withhold records when they felt it was necessary for national security. See Davis, The
Information Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 763-65 (1967) for a more
exhaustive treatment of the subject.
8 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1972).
9 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966).
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machinery to assure the availability of Government information
necessary to an informed electorate.' 0
It appears to be clear from these authorities that the basic purpose of
the Act was to provide the electorate more information on the processes
of the government which makes policy decisions affecting their everyday
lives.
Several commentaries have been written about the Freedom of Information Act since it was passed. One of the earliest comments upon
the Act is an analysis." In this article, Professor Davis 12 goes into great
detail on certain parts of the Act, often pointing out deficiencies in
draftsmanship. 1 A very recent article states that the Act "has not fulfilled its advocates' most modest aspirations."' 14
The specific area of law discussed in the case involves one of the
exemptions against disclosure of information which the federal government is accorded under the Freedom of Information Act. This
exemption reads:
(b) This section (of the Administrative Procedure Act) requiring
agencies to make information available to the public does not apply
to . .. (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than
an agency.'
Senate and House Reports have examined the "investigatory files"
exemption.
This would include files prepared in connection with related Government litigation and adjudicative proceedings. S. 1160 is not
intended to give a private party indirectly any earlier or greater
access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such
litigation or proceedings.' 6
A Senate Report further states:
Exemption No. 7 deals with "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes." These are the files prepared by Government agencies to prosecute law violators. Their disclosure of such
files, except to the extent they are available by law
to a private
7
party, could harm the Government's case in court.'
10 H.R. REP'. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966).
11 Davis, The Information Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967).
12 Kenneth Culp Davis is the John P. Wilson Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School.
13 Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761 (1967).
14 Katz, The Games BureaucratsPlay: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information
Act, 48 TExAs L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1970).
155 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
16 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966).
17 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965).
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Thus, the legislative history of exemption (7) of the Freedom of Information Act indicates that its purpose was to allow the Government
to withhold files which they are using in adjudicatory proceedings and
which are not available to another party by law.' 8 An eminent jurist
bears this out when she explains, "Once litigation is concluded, disclosure is impliedly required."'19
The majority holding in the case of Frankel v. SEC 20 appears to
contrast somewhat with the legislative intent as set out above. In applying the legislative intent to the facts in the Frankel case, the court
reasoned that Congress had two basic purposes in enacting the exemption for investigatory files. These were: (1) to prevent information
used in litigation from being given out prematurely so that the government might present as strong a case as possible in court and (2)
to keep secret the means and procedures by which the government
obtained its information and conducted its investigation. "Both these
forms of confidentiality are necessary for effective law enforcement. "21
The majority cites Evans v. Department of Transportation22 as authority for their holding that the "investigatory files" exemption applies
even when adjudicatory proceedings and all investigations have been
terminated.
In Evans, the plaintiff tried to obtain possession of letters which had
been written to the Federal Aviation Administration alleging him to
be mentally unfit for service as a commercial airlines pilot. The suit
was not filed until approximately six years after he had been examined
and had been proven competent. He brought action to find out the
identity of the letter writer. 23 The court denied the request, stating:
We are of the further opinion that Congress could not possibly
have intended that such letters should be disclosed once an investi18 The phrase "which are not available to another party by law" concerns itself with
the procedural process of discovery in an enforcement proceeding. Attorney General Clark
explained this fairly well in discussing the Act:
The effect of the language in exemption (7), on the other hand, seems to be to confirm the availability to litigants of documents from investigatory files to the extent to
which Congress and the courts have made them available to such litigants. For example, litigants who meet the burdens of the Jencks statute (18 U.S.C. 3500) may
obtain a prior statement given to an FBI agent or an S.E.C. investigator by a witness
who is testifying in a pending case; but since such statements might contain information
unfairly damaging to the litigant or other persons, the new law, like the Jencks Act,
does not permit the statement to be made available to the public.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE APA 38
(1967), as quoted in Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. REv. 1261, 1283 (1970).
19 Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TExAs L. REV. 1261, 1279 (1970).

20 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972).
21 Id. at 817.

22 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, (1972).
23 Id. at 822.
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gation is completed. If this were so, and disclosure were made, it
would soon become a matter of common knowledge with the result
that few individuals, if any, would come forth to embroil themselves in controversy or possible recrimination by notifying the
Aviation Agency of something which might justify invesFederal 24
tigation.
This reasoning provides the basis for one last argument which the
majority makes in the Frankel case. The Frankel court contends that
if an agency's investigatory files were given out, without limitation,
after law enforcement proceedings had terminated, it would hinder
the agency's law enforcement efforts in the future. 25 The court's reasoning is that if investigatory techniques and the names of informants
were disclosed to the public, informants would be less likely to come
to the agency with information in the future (knowing they might be
revealed). 26 The majority concludes by saying that disclosure would
not defeat the general purpose of The Freedom of Information Act,
27
but would defeat important purposes of the exemption.
The dissent attacks the majority's reasoning by explaining that the
legislative intent behind the Freedom of Information Act in general
is one of disclosure. In dissenting, Judge Oakes states:
I think the Act contains an underlying recognition that disclosure
of the workings of a government bureaucracy, which long since has
suffered the 'curse of bigness,' can benefit the agency by increasing
its sense of responsibility to the public. The Freedom of Information Act has as its aim, in other words, a delegation by Congress
to the federal courts of the power to subject agency operations to
public perusal. Behind this policy are some of the same considerations which underpin freedom of the press. .... 28
The dissent cites several cases to support its argument that the "investigatory files" exemption is not meant to apply after litigation has been
completed involving those files.29 Most of these cases explain that the
purpose of the exemption is to prevent disclosure of investigatory
material while law enforcement proceedings are in progress or are sure
to be forthcoming, not after proceedings have been completed.8 0
24 Id. at 824.

Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1972).
26 Id. at 817.
27 Id. at 818.
28 Id. at 819.
29 E.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424
F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824, 91 S. Ct. 46, 27 L. Ed.2d 52 (1970); Cooney v.
Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
30 See, e.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,
424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp.
708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
25
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Judge Oakes concludes by saying that through in camera examination of investigatory files, a district judge may safeguard informants and
agency techniques. 1 This, he claims, makes the majority's argument
concerning fear of exposure practically groundless and reduces the
SEC's argument to the contention that files should not be disclosed to
just "any person." Judge Oakes points out that plaintiffs are in litigation with Occidental and do not come under that category. 2
An analysis of the reasoning of the majority in the Frankel case makes
it clear that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit feels that the
"investigatory files" exemption of the Freedom of Information Act is
one which is to be construed broadly, giving the governmental agencies
much discretion and a large area in which to declare information
exempt. Under the court's interpretation of the exemption it appears
that a federal agency might withhold investigatory files indefinitely
after the litigation for which they were used has terminated. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is cited as authority for this holding through the Evans case and NLRB v. Clement Bros.83
The court in the NLRB case states that in an earlier case they decided that files need not be disclosed after litigation has terminated.
The court quotes from Texas Industries, Inc. v. NLRB 34 for most of
their reasoning:
It would seem axiomatic that if an employee knows his statements to Board agents will be freely discoverable by his employer,
he will be less candid in his disclosures. The employee will be
understandably reluctant to reveal information prejudicial to his
employer when the employer can easily find out that he has done
so.... In order to assure vindication of employee rights under the
Act, it is essential that the Board be able to conduct effective investigations and secure supporting statements from employees. We
feel that preserving the confidentiality of employee statements is
conducive to this end.8 5
This appears to be very sound reasoning at first glance. However, the
argument for safeguarding informants was refuted by Judge Oakes in
his dissent in the Frankelcase by his argument for the judge's in camera
examination. 6 Another very interesting point is that the Texas Indus81 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 818 (2d Cir. 1972). The Freedom of Information Act provides for a district court judge to take information or files of the government into his
chambers (in camera) in order to decide whether they should be disclosed or not. Judge
Oakes makes the point that if, in the judge's opinion, disclosure of the information would
be harmful, he may forbid it.
82 Id. at 820.
38 407 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1969).
84 336 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964).
85 Id. at 134.
86 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972) (dissenting opinion).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol4/iss2/8

6

Taylor: The Government May Withhold Investigatory Materials Compiled for

1972]

CASE NOTES

tries case was decided prior to the Freedom of Information Act. This
means that the court in NLRB relied on a case for authority to explain
the court's view of part of an act which had not been passed yet. The
Freedom of Information Act appears to have had no effect on the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The dissent in the present case, while not attacking the actual
authority which the majority cites as supporting their reasoning, does
state:
It is, therefore, not surprising that other respectable courts have
taken a view differing from that of the majority today and of the
Fifth Circuit in Evans v. Department of Transportation(citations
omitted), upon which the majority relies.3 7
The dissenting judge cites Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC,8 s a recent decision
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which spoke of
the Fredom of Information Act in general. "The legislative plan [of the
Act] creates a liberal disclosure requirement, limited only by specific
exemptions which are to be narrowly construed."8 9 Concerning the
specific exemption in question, the court in Bristol-Myers wrote:
But the agency cannot, consistent with the broad disclosure mandate of the Act, protect all its files with the label "investigatory"
and a suggestion that enforcement proceedings may be launched at
some unspecified future date. Thus the District Court must determine whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete
enough to bring into operation the exemption for investigatory
files .... 40
The Bristol-Myers case goes on to explain that the exemption should
not be imposed unless "further adjudicatory proceedings are imminent." 41 Further litigation hardly appears imminent in the Frankel
case. Moreover, in the Frankel case, the district court did determine
that the prospect of litigation or enforcement proceedings was not
concrete enough to apply the exemption. 42 Nevertheless, the majority
appeared to ignore this and overruled the district court. 43
The dissent cites more authority which holds for the proposition that
the exemption should not apply after enforcement proceedings have
terminated. 44 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit does not go
Id. at 819.
88 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824, 91 S. Ct. 46, 27 L. Ed.2d 52 (1970).
39 Id. at 938.
40 Id. at 939.
41 Id. at 939.
42 Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972).
48 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 819 (2d Cir. 1972).
44 E.g., Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
37
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specifically to the present question, but in Wellford v. Hardin45 it
reasons:
We agree with the district court that the legislative history of
this exemption reveals that its purpose was to prevent premature
discovery by a defendant in an enforcement proceeding. 46
Concerning the Act in general, the court in Wellford said:
The Freedom of Information Act was not designed to increase
administrative efficiency, but to guarantee the public's right to
know how the government is discharging its duty to protect the
public interest. 47
A federal district court used much of the same language as Wellford in
stating that the purpose of the "investigatory files" exemption is to
"avoid a premature disclosure of an agency's case when engaged in law
enforcement activities.

' 48

In summary, the Frankel case has decided against the great weight
of authority concerning the Freedom of Information Act and the
"investigatory files" exemption under that Act. By protecting this government agency's information, the majority is going against the trend
of cases and commentaries which interpret it as being enacted to give
the public greater access to government operations. Specifically, the
majority made it virtually impossible for a person to obtain any investigatory material from a governmental agency so long as the material
was used in conjunction with law enforcement proceedings at any one
time. Unfortunately, the majority refused to take into account the
provision in the act for in camera examination by a district judge of the
files. The dissenting judge used this provision most effectively to break
down the majority's arguments against disclosure. Considering the
recent emphasis on protection of the public and individual's rights, 49
this decision appears inconsistent with popular trends.
George Aaron Taylor
45 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
46 Id. at 23.

Id. at 24.
Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(court's emphasis).
49 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed.2d 799 (1963); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954).
47
48
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